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THE PROCESS SPECTRUM IN SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT:
AN EXPLORATORY SURVEY AND INTERPRETATION
INTRODUCTION
A question treated in fields ranging from history, sociology, and
organization studies to economics and management is why and how firms evolve
beyond "craft" or job-shop modes of production to benefit from disciplined
engineering and large-scale factory operations. Some researchers have
maintained that mass-production engineering and factory systems emerged after
industries "matured" -- when product standards appeared and companies began
paying more attention to design and process innovations that improved
manufacturing efficiency (Abernathy and Utterback). The de-skilling or
routinization of work, high-levels of control over production tasks and process
flows, divisions and specialization of labor, mechanization and automation,
interchangeable parts, and standardized designs were some of the major
innovations that have come to characterize large-scale factory systems in a
variety of industries (Woodward, 1965; Chandler, 1977; Hounschell, 1984). In
more generic terms, these characteristics reflect "bureaucratic" organizational
structures and marketing strategies focusing on low costs and low prices,
perhaps at the expense of reductions in product variety or functionality (Porter,
1980).
While some academic researchers, managers, workers, and other critics
have found fault with factory systems and bureaucracies for the constraints
they place on employee discretion and creativity, bureaucratic approaches have
become extremely common in the industrialized world because they are efficient,
given the problems that most organizations face and the limited solutions or
technologies most have at their disposal (Miewald, 1970; Perrow, 1972; Jacoby,
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1973). Without bureaucratic engineering and factory systems, few people would
ride in cars or have access to a wide range of industrial products and services.
On the other hand, too much standardization or rigidity in products and
processes can lead to customer and employee dissatisfaction and decrease the
ability of firms to meet competitive challenges such as changes in consumer
desires and technology. The classic example of this was Ford's dramatic decline
in market share during the mid-1920s, despite rising levels of productivity, when
market demand and competitor offerings shifted to a greater variety of
differentiated products (Abernathy and Wayne, 1974; Abernathy, 1978).
There are, in addition, interdependent organizational, technological, and
strategic issues: A structured, standardized process may be inherently
unsuitable for a dynamic environment and an unstandardized technology
requiring complex development tasks. In fact, variability in individual
productivity and quality, along with continual evolution in technology and
market needs, have prompted debates over whether software development will
always be more like an "art" or a "craft" rather than a technology suitable for
the discipline of engineering processes and factory-like organizations (Brooks,
1975; Shooman, 1983; Hauptman, 1986). It is this issue -- what do software
producers look like, in terms of basic organizational and process characteristics,
and what should they look like -- that prompted this study. The research
began with an exploratory survey that tested a simple hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Not all managers in software firms ignore standardization and
control over tools and processes, or reusability of components -- concepts
associated with disciplined engineering and factory production in other
industries. Rather, firms probably fall into a spectrum, with some managers
emphasizing factory-like concepts more than others.
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This paper describes the rationale behind different types of organizations
and processes, the survey of managers, and the results, as well as offers a
framework for understanding how firms may segment their products and
processes, as well as utilize other measures to improve efficiency while
retaining enough flexibility to offer customized or unique products and adapt to
changes in technology or the marketplace. The analysis of specific facilities,
including performance measures, is reported elsewhere and part of continuing
research. 1
RATIONALE FOR A PROCESS SPECTRUM -- EVEN IN SOFTWARE
Software products fall into two broad categories: basic or system
software, and applications. Basic software serves to control the primary
functions of computer hardware, and includes operating systems, database
management systems, telecommunications monitors, computer-language
translators, and "utilities" such as program editors. Applications software sits,
at least figuratively, on top of basic operating systems, and performs specific
"user-oriented" tasks. These again include pre-written or "packaged" programs
such as for payroll accounting, spreadsheet analysis, word processing, and other
standard operations, as well as "custom" software written for specific tasks and
customers, such as in the banking, financial services, manufacturing,
government, or defense sectors. Another type of application are programs
written as parts of integrated hardware and software systems (U.S. Department
of Commerce, 1985).
One way to view the design and production of these programs is as a
process of analysis and translation: analyzing a problem and then breaking it
down into a series of smaller tasks expressed in manner ultimately
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understandable to a computer. Programmers begin by translating problems into
design specifications and then design specifications into "source code" written in
a high-level (English-like) computer language. The next step is to translate the
high-level program into a lower-level machine-language called "object code,"
consisting of zeros and ones that serve as instructions for the computer
hardware. Special computer programs called compilers usually perform this
transformation automatically, although design of the compilers, as well as prior
steps in program development, frequently require considerable human thought
and judgement (Arden: 564).
The development cycle continues in that software must still be tested and
frequently changed, repaired, or enhanced (maintained), before and after
delivery to users. In terms of time and costs, excluding those incurred during
operations and maintenance, testing is usually the most labor intensive phase,
followed by implementation (detailed design and coding) and high-level design.
For a product that continues in service with periodic modifications, post-
delivery maintenance may become by far the most costly activity, consuming as
much as 70% of total expenditures over its lifetime, according to commonly-
cited data on life-cycle costs (Boehm, 1976; Ramamoorthy et al., 1984).
While most software projects go through similar phases that appear
sequential, the production process is more iterative, i.e. developers go back and
forth among requirements analysis, specification, program design, coding,
testing, redesign, re-testing, and so on. Experienced programmers or managers
may give precise estimates of the time and labor each phase requires for
particular applications, although numerous uncertainties upset schedules and
budgets and thus make at least some software development something less than
an exact science or engineering discipline. For example, project requirements
might contain new functions that become difficult to build, customers often
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change their minds about features they desire, and programmers usually take
different amounts of time to perform similar operations. Furthermore, the
larger projects become in terms of total length of code, numbers of components,
and numbers of people, the more complex the interactions required become, and
the greater the uncertainty of'the final product's cost, schedule, and
performance.
Variations in programmer performance appear to stem from differences not
simply in native ability, but also in the particular experiences of the individual.
A programmer who has written an inventory-control system in the past probably
can complete another inventory-control system in less time than it would take a
novice. The relationship of experience to productivity reflects the reality that
software, though a generic type of product or technology, may vary enormously
in content. The number and type of operations it must perform in each
application greatly affect the amount of thought, time, and experience required
to solve problems and write computer code. The need to adjust to each
application or situation makes it difficult for producers to establish and
maintain standards, controls, and schedules, as well as divide labor, automate
tasks, and reuse components -- the essence of factory production.
Software thus appears to have characteristics -- little product or process
standardization to support economies of scale in production operations, wide
variations in project contents and work flows, planning and production tasks
that are difficult to divide or de-skill -- that make disciplined engineering or
factory-like operations difficult and perhaps unwise or impossible to introduce
for many firms and applications. Software producers have to contend not only
with constant evolution in technology and customer requirements, but also with
demand for products with customized features.
To accommodate such a "non-routine" technology and dynamic environment,
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many software producers embrace highly flexible, even "ad hoc" organizational
structures and production processes, with little use of formal procedures or
standards, such as in job shops or craft production in other industries. They
hire mainly experienced or talented programmers, provide a loose set of work
guidelines and product specifications, and rely on small teams to complete
projects aimed either at customizing a product for a particular customer or
developing a "packaged" program for mass-replication and distribution. These
practices were essential in the early days of the industry, when product
requirements were new and changing constantly, and programs were small, due
to hardware limitations. Craft-oriented job-shop approaches continue to work
well when product requirements are new or ill-defined, and software projects
can be completed by a small group of people working in an integrated team.
But, for many companies and in many situations, while small teams of
experts may be desirable, they are not practical. Shortages of skilled people,
lengthy and complicated projects to finish within time or budget constraints,
and products that different sets of people must maintain in the future, provide
huge incentives for managers to adopt a more structured process -- covering
methods, tools, procedures, controls, worker skills, and product components or
designs -- to reduce skill requirements and systematically recycle process or
design knowhow and other key factors of production among different projects.
To structure software development or similar technologies successfully, however,
managers must solve two fundamental problems that require linkages in
competitive strategy and market positioning, organizational structure and
personnel management, and product and process technology development: when
to introduce a more formalized and standardized process; and how to achieve a
balance between efficiency and flexibility acceptable to workers and customers
as well as supportive of the firm's competitive positioning.
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This very practical dilemma for managers reflects a long-standing academic
debate. One set of positions, represented by various contingency theorists,
range from the assertion that there is no one best way to do anything to the
belief that optimal selections are contingent on if not determined by factors
such as the stability of the environment (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), the
characteristics of the technology (Woodward, 1965; Perrow, 1967), the size of
the organization (Blau and Schoenherr, 1971), or political processes within the
firm (March and Simon, 1958; Pfeffer, 1981). Others argue that managers can
significantly shape the structure of their organizations and the technology--
tools, techniques, information, and other elements used to make products or
services -- they require by selecting different competitive positions (Child, 1972;
Chandler, 1962 and 1977; Miles and Snow, 1978).
Contingency factors appear to account for no more than 50 to 60 percent
of the variability in structure among organizations (Pugh, 1973; Robbins, 1987:
176). But if they exert even this much influence on the options open to
managers, and optimal choices, then one might hypothesize that all software
producers -- or all "successful" software producers -- should look like
unstructured, highly flexible job shops, not "factories." But there should also
be exceptions -- if managers can identify segments of their industry where
relatively standardized processes and product components are appropriate at
least for some customers, and then introduce a more structured or even
"bureaucratic" system. This would require not simply an intermediate position
between craft and factory production in terms of volume of output or scale of
operations. Factory-like software facilities would have to reconcile seemingly
contradictory elements, such as the ability to standardize process, skills, and
perhaps product components, but still produce unique or customized products
rather than engage in mass production. These organizations would also have to
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evolve along with the technology, or risk falling hopelessly behind industry
leaders and customer requirements.
The characteristics factory-like software facilities need to embrace also
would make it difficult to categorize them in terms of conventional
organizational designs or economic justifications based on economies of scale
and mass production (Mansfield, 1985). An example is Joan Woodward's
identification of three basic types of production: unit or craft production; mass
production; and continuous processing, as in chemical manufacturing. In unit
production, which relied on highly skilled workers, little formalization of
organizational rules and procedures, and little centralization of decision-making
authority, tasks were non-routine and usually manual. Mass production dealt
with more complex but repetitious operations susceptible to standardization,
economies of scale, formalization, divisions of labor, and mechanization.
Continuous processing, since it was highly automated, did not usually require
extensive centralization, formalization, or divisions of labor (Woodward: 35-50).
At first glance, software development, except for electronic replication of
finished programs, appears to fall neatly into the realm of unit or craft
production -- making one product at a time for a specific customer or set of
requirements, rather than mass-producing components and finished products
through a sequential assembly process or continuous automated operation. Yet,
some software producers began adopting formal rules and procedures, and
divisions of labor, as early as the 1960s. They also managed to "mechanize"
some operations, i.e. support them through computer-aided systems, and
"automate" others, i.e design them to be performed automatically, with little or
no human intervention. Thus the histories of actual firms suggests that not all
software development falls into the category of unit or craft production, not
even in the early days of the industry.
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A classification problem arises with another widely-accepted organizational
scheme elaborated on by Henry Mintzberg (Mintzberg, 1979). In this
terminology, factory-like software facilities probably came closest to a
"professional bureaucracy" -- with standardized but specialized skills,
procedures, and tools controlling the work process rather than a conventional
administrative apparatus. The notion that professionalization of the work force
can serve the same functions as bureaucratic administration in mass-production
industries, while allowing for more flexibility to adapt to different customer
needs or changes in the work flow, dates back to the work of Arthur
Stinchcombe on the construction industry in the late 1950s (Stinchcombe, 1959).
Other examples of professional bureaucracies include engineering consultants and
hospitals.
But descriptions of professional bureaucracies claim they rely on
decentralized structures -- lots of individual or small-group activities -- and
little formal divisions of labor. In contrast, accounts of factory-like approaches
to software development in Japan (Matsumoto, 1987; Cusumano, 1989) as well as
in the U.S. (Orlikowski, 1988), sometimes located teams at customer sites,
although they generally did this in the planning and high-level design phases
and attempted to centralize detailed design and programming operations in
large-scale, capital-intensive facilities. Professional bureaucracies, by definition,
also consisted of professionals that had years of education in specific fields.
Software producers nominally adopting factory practices hired mainly college
graduates unskilled in software and then trained them to use a standardized
methodology and tool set (built, of course, by more expert people).
In this sense, at least some software facilities contained elements
characterizing mass-production factories in other industries, which some
theorists have labeled "machine bureaucracies" (including divisional structures in
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large organizations): standardized tasks, unskilled employees grouped into
functional departments, centralized authority, high levels of rigid mechanization
or automation, and formal divisions of labor. Yet tasks in factory-like software
facilities did not seem completely de-skilled; most projects required technical
abilities, adaptation, and thought on the part of designers and people who built
and tested products. Functional departments and divisions of labor also did not
appear so rigid, and managers routinely used matrices -- project teams
consisting of members borrowed temporarily from functional departments--
which Mintzberg and many others have associated with a loosely structured
"adhocracy," a term referring primarily to teams of specialists relying on ad hoc
structures and procedures (Mintzberg, 1979: 431-467).
These organizational types contrast to a "simple structure," characterized
by little or no formal procedures or processes, decision making done by one
person or a small group, such as in a small family-owned store or
entrepreneurial firm. Simple structures were apparently common in the early
days of the software industry and still seem to characterize small "software
houses." Yet, as many software producers have discovered, once organizations
and production operations grow over time, more elaborate structures and
controls become essential (Woodward, 1965; Mintzberg, 1979).
Another classification scheme, suggested by Charles Perrow, is more useful
in that it focuses on task variability and how personnel analyze problems (Table
1). Organizations dealing with "routine technologies" encounter few exceptions
and thus face problems that, over time, become easier to analyze and solve
through formal procedures or tools. This standardized process eliminates the
need to have large numbers of highly-skilled (and usually expensive) employees
capable of re-inventing solutions each time problems occur. Firms dealing with
"engineering technologies" have more exceptions, but these are still relatively
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well-defined and, according to Perrow, can be managed systematically. Perrow
contrasts routine and engineering technologies with "craft" technologies, defined
by a limited range of variability but problems that were ill-defined and difficult
to analyze, as well as "non-routine" technologies, which indicated many
exceptional and difficult tasks (Perrow, 1967).
But even this scheme does not adequately categorize factory-like software
organizations, which clearly exhibited some features of routine, mass production.
Factory-like software facilities appeared to standardize only some tasks that
were only relatively de-skilled; they relied on only some divisions of labor and
only relatively formalized rules and procedures -- compared to modes of
operations before managers explicitly adopted more structured approaches, or to
explicitly "adhocratic" firms or organizations with little or no formal structures.
THE SURVEY OF MANAGER EMPHASES
The claims of some software producers to have adopted factory-like
practices, in both Japan and the U.S., prompted this author to identify and
examine those companies that explicitly tried to organize the production of
commercial software (programs written for sale or inclusion with hardware) by
establishing what managers called "software factories" or, at least, by adopting
what managers termed factory strategies and objectives. These firms consisted
of System Development Corporation (SDC, currently a division of Unisys) in the
U.S., which launched a small factory in the mid-1970s before disbanding it after
three years due to the preference of project managers to development software
in integrated groups at customer sites in the U.S. (Cusumano, 1988a); and
Hitachi, Toshiba, NEC, and Fujitsu in Japan (Cusumano 1987a, 1987b, 1987c,
1988b), which launched several factories or factory-like efforts between 1969
and the early 1980s (Table 2). While in certain key respects the customers SDC
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aimed at were very different from those the Japanese served, these firms were
comparable to the extent they all made unique systems or customized
applications software for large computers, and had to manage lengthy and often
extremely complex projects. 2
A problem with this sample arose in that, while the term "factory" was
particularly popular or acceptable in Japan, U.S. and European firms after SDC
tended not to use the term factory except to describe standardized tool and
methodology sets. But there were estimates of as many as 200 enterprises in
the U.S. alone with more than 1000 software personnel in centralized facilities,
emphasizing -- at least to some degree -- standardized designs and reusable
code components, common tool development, formal testing and quality
assurance procedures, productivity measurement and improvement efforts, and
process research (Jones, 1986: 243). In addition, interviews and historical
research indicated that IBM in the U.S. was probably the first company in the
world to create a structured, bureaucratic process and organization for
software, which it did in the mid-1960s to develop operating systems for the
System/360 family of computers. Yet IBM has never used the term "software
factory," and has continued to label its facilities "laboratories" or "programming
centers." Thus the existence of large software producers around the world,
some explicitly using the term factory and others avoiding it though seeming to
follow some factory-like practices, indicates that mere adoption of a name,
though it may reflect specific management objectives, is not in itself
meaningful.
To provide some perspective on what managers emphasized apart from the
labels they used, a next step in the research was to survey managers at 52
large software facilities (25 Japanese, 26 U.S., 1 Canadian) at 30 companies in
North America and Japan. The survey was exploratory in the sense that it
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simply tested to see if current managers embraced emphases adopted earlier in
the SDC Software Factory, rather than trying to present a definitive model of
what constituted a "factory" approach.
The published descriptions and stated objectives for the SDC Software
Factory provided a comprehensive formulation of what a basic factory for
software might look like. In particular, these materials suggested eight criteria
relating to inputs standardization (emphasis on reuse of software code) and tool
or process standardization and control. SDC relied on or hoped to build a
centralized program library to store modules, documentation, and completed
programs; a central database to track production-management data; a uniform
set of procedures for specification, design, coding, testing, and documentation;
standardized project databases to guide individuals and groups constructing
different parts of a program; and an on-line computerized interface linking
various tools and databases. These five variables constituted the core process
and too, questions in the survey. Since another type of factory strategy should
be to produce standardized components and then to reuse them, rather than
"reinventing the wheel" with every customer order, three questions were
included about design for reuse, execution of reusability, and control
(monitoring of reuse rates).
Major software producers in Japan and North America were identified
through literature surveys and lists of software producers; further investigation
led to the identification of senior managers either responsible for overall
software engineering management or with responsibilities over several projects
and with sufficient experience to present an overview of practices for an entire
facility or product division. The intention was to study manager emphases at
the facility or product-division level, since software practices usually differed
significantly among divisions in diversified or large firms, and some diversity
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seemed useful to meet different market or internal needs.
Managers who agreed to participate in the survey received a questionnaire
containing the eight core questions plus more than a dozen others asking for
supplementary data. 3 For the core questions, they had to rank their emphasis
and impression of general policy at their facilities on a scale of 0 to 4, as well
as to comment on each answer. Optional questions also requested performance
measures such as actual rates of reused code in a recent sample year. The
intent of the survey and meaning of questions was explained at least to the
individuals in each firm handling distribution of the questionnaires. Japanese
managers were sent questionnaires in English but asked to comment on each
question either in Japanese or English.
The sample was limited to facilities or departments making products that
usually require large amounts of people, time, and tools to develop, and which
might therefore provide incentives for managers at least on the facility level to
seek similarities and common components or tools across different projects:
operating systems for mainframes or minicomputers ("systems" software); and
real-time applications programs, such as for factory control or reservations
systems ("applications" software). The analysis that follows further broke these
down into telecommunications software, commercial operating systems, industrial
operating systems, real-time control applications, and general business
applications.
All the Japanese firms contacted filled out the survey; about 75% of the
other firms contacted completed the survey. To check for consistency in
answers, two managers at each firm or facility were asked to respond, although
only about one-third the companies returned two completed surveys for each
type of facility. Among those, the answers were similar, differing by only a few
percentage points, and therefore were averaged. Two thirds of the answers,
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however, represent single responses.4
RESULTS
A factor analysis procedure with varimax rotation indicated that the eight
questions constituted two approximately orthogonal factors, listed as the inputs
and tool and process dimensions in Table 3. Both factors had an eigenvalue
rounding to approximately 1.0 or higher and together explained nearly 82% of
the variance in the survey answers; the inputs dimension alone accounted for
62% of the variance. For each dimension, the variables with a strong loading
(minimum 0.4) were summed and used to test differences in the average
Japanese and North American scores, as well as to test if product type or
country of origin of the facility were significantly correlated with the process
and reuse scores. 5
The data reported in Table 4 reflects scores for each dimension; Table 5
summarizes the average Japanese and North American responses to the inputs
and tools/process dimensions. Table 6 presents the results of analysis of
variance tests to determine the effects of product types or country of origin on
the scores reported for the two dimensions. Tables 7 and 8 compare reuse
rates reported by the Japanese and North American facilities, and analyze
correlations with type of product and country of origin. Table 9 is a regression
analysis looking at the correlation between manager responses and reported
reuse rates.
The results support the hypothesis that there is a spectrum among
managers in how they answered the survey questions. These answers also
corresponded closely to case studies in progress of individual firms. Thus it
clearly seems that, despite potential views of software development as largely a
craft, art, or "job-shop" type of operation, some managers at facilities making
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similar types of products were able to place more emphasis on control and
standardization of inputs (reusable modules of code) as well as basic tools and
process questions. The analysis of variance tests confirmed that product types,
at least defined generally, had no significant impact on where managers scored
on either of the dimensions surveyed.
The data also confirm there are probably national differences in reusability
emphasis. Japanese firms scored much higher on the inputs (8.7 to 5.9)
dimension (significant at 0.001), while there was no significant difference in
Japanese and North American responses on the tools and process dimension.
Reported actual reuse rates in Japan were also significantly higher than in
North America (34.8% versus 15.4%), across all product types. The reuse data
are very tentative and subject to different methods of counting across firms.
Nonetheless, they suggest that Japanese applications producers, who clearly are
marketing customized products, as well as Japanese systems producers, who sell
basic software, both tend to rely on reused code. Recycling standardized
components at Japanese applications producers is probably due to the huge
demand for custom software, as opposed to packages (low demand for which
appears to stem from the desire of Japanese firms to have unique features in
their software), and the expense of writing similar applications for different
customers from scratch with each order (Table 10).
The emphasis on reuse in commercial operating systems and other types of
software also seemed to reflect process decisions to maximize efficiency, even
with nominally unique products. Compatibility of a firm's hardware
architectures and operating systems across different size machines, such as with
Digital's VAX line, is an important factor facilitating reuse. As indicated in
Table 9, however, it also appeared that manager emphases had some impact of
this variable. There was a significant correlation between high emphases on
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reusability and high reported rates of actual reuse.
Figure 1 presents another configuration of the survey responses. Some
clearly fell into the upper right-hand corner of the matrix and thus could be
characterized as "job shops," with little or no emphasis on standardization,
control, or reuse. Those in the lower left appeared more like "flexible"
factories or integrated design and production systems in the sense that
managers strongly emphasized reuse as well as standardization and control in
the design and construction of new products that were both unique and
customized for different customers. Most responses also fell on the right side
of the matrix, and U.S. responses on tool and process questions were not
significantly different from the Japanese, though most (but not all) of the
facilities in the lower right were Japanese. The survey of managers thus
indicated that (1) a spectrum, including factory-like emphases, existed in both
Japan and North America, independent of product type; and (2) Japanese firms
were significantly different at least in their emphasis on one factory-like
characteristic: reusability.
Some firms in the survey appeared to be in the "high-end" of the market.
These included Draper Laboratories, Honeywell, and Nippon Electronics
Development, which designed unique command-control missile systems, satellite-
control systems, and other programs largely for government or specialized use.
They did not emphasize reuse of code across different projects possibly because
most of their work was unique from job to job. However, managers at some
of their direct competitors -- Unisys/SDC, TRW, Unisys/Sperry, Toshiba--
placed much more emphasis on reuse as well as other measures of process
control or tool standardization and integration that might be associated with a
more factory-like approach. This again suggests that various process
approaches are possible even in similar market segments.
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The only firms in this sample that developed applications packages on a
significant scale were IBM, Cullinet, and Computervision. They also showed a
range in emphases, suggesting IBM placed relatively more emphasis on reuse,
while Computervision appeared to operate more in a job shop or perhaps
laboratory mode, with very little emphasis on the variables in the survey.
There are several caveats to this survey, however. I. t, of course,
represents no more than a sampling of the self-reported opinions of one or two
middle managers from major software producing firms, rather than a
comprehensive analysis of actual practices in projects done within product
groups in partic:ular firms. Managers might be exaggerating or understating
their emphases on the various questions, although the respondents were
carefully selected and an attempt was made to examine the comments and other
documents, such as technical articles, and to interview managers in person or
by phone, and visit some actual sites, to see if answers corresponded to
realities. Detailed interviews and/or site visits were conducted for NT&T,
Mitsubishi, Fujitsu, NEC, Hitachi, Digital, IBM, Data General, Unisys/SDC,
Draper, Nippon Systemware, Hitachi, Hitachi Software Engineering, and Nippon
Business Consultants.
Another reservation regarding the survey is that, although managers were
asked to report on general practices in their areas, some companies reported
high levels of variability within projects. This appeared especially true in the
cases of Digital and Hitachi Software Engineering. In Digital, while there were
rigorous corporate guidelines, top management placed more emphasis on the
characteristics of final products rather than the development process, and
individual groups were allowed considerable autonomy, especially in applications.
Thus, while there was a management policy of stressing reusability, some
project managers, even within the VAX and VMS product areas, did not appear
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to emphasize reuse at all.6 In the case of Hitachi Software Engineering, some
groups worked directly within Hitachi's software factories, following the factory
procedures and using the factory tools with the same degree of conformity as
Hitachi employees. Other groups worked on independent projects where
customers determined the standards. For this reason, there was a large
variation within Hitachi Software Engineering as a company and within product
areas, and thus managers felt compelled to score themselves on the low end of
the spectrum, even though they managed many projects using procedures
identical to Hitachi's. 7
Furthermore, since the sample size is relatively small in absolute numbers,
the results of this analysis must be considered as no more than suggestive of
managerial emphases existing at the participating software facilities and in the
two geographic settings. It should be noted, however, that the surveyed
Japanese firms accounted for what seems to be the majority of software
commercially written and sold in Japan, while the surveyed North American
firms included most of the large producers of operating systems and applications
software, and other basic software products such as data bases. 8
There is also other evidence supporting the observation that firms, in both
software and computer hardware, position themselves through different
combinations of price and product performance. Surveys of nearly 20,000 users
of products offered by U.S. and Japanese vendors in the Japanese market
indicated large variations in customer satisfaction, with Japanese firms trailing
U.S. vendors mainly in basic software and Japanese vendors leading U.S. firms
in areas such as hardware price-performance and applications system
engineering. Furthermore, in examining pricing data, the same surveys indicated
a clear spectrum among U.S. and Japanese vendors in this measure as well, with
Japanese prices averaging about half those of U.S. vendors (Cusumano, 1988c).
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INTERPRETATION: STRATEGIC POSITIONING
Compared to conventional production-system archetypes, factory-like
software facilities in Japan or elsewhere seemed to fall somewhere in the middle
of a continuum of production approaches and perhaps product types as well. In
other industries, this spectrum stretched from loosely-structured job or craft
shops on one end to highly structured organizations on the other, integrating
engineering and factory operations oriented toward mass production (Figure 2).
In software, case studies suggested that factory-like approaches, especially in
applications areas, relied on tools and methods that made them resemble what
might be termed "flexible design and production systems"' such as in
application-specific semiconductor design and fabrication (ASIC), or integrated
computer-aided design and manufacturing (CAD/CAM) and flexible manufacturing
systems (FMS) in a variety of industries (Harvard Business School, 1986).
Figure 2 suggests that, in firms competing in various types of industries,
this combination of flexibility and efficiency comes through the use not of
fully-standardized methods, tools, components, and designs, but through
limitations on the range of products and customers served, and planning for
economies of scope -- savings from some joint use of inputs or factors of
production that, once acquired to make a particular product, might be used to
make others at less cost than would otherwise be the case, as in reuse of
designs or process RD (Baumol et al., 1982; Lorange et al., 1986). Also useful
to achieve this balance are process and quality standardization and control, a
combination of tailored and centralized process R&D, standardization of worker
skills, some divisions of labor, systematic reuse of product designs or code, and
extensive use of computer-aided tools. In practice, software firms did not use
factory approaches for all types of products or customers, but only for those
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that were relatively well-understood and had some commonality across different
projects .
This notion of putting only some work in factories and less routine work
in other facilities (less-structured subsidiaries, software houses, or laboratories,
for example) reflects another observation about how managers in factory-like
software facilities managed product development: They adopted different
strategies and structures to compete in different segments of a larger market--
software. Figure 3 summarizes how firms appeared to segment products,
processes, and customers, based on a series of case studies. These suggest
strongly that successful factory-like approaches targeted the "middle" of a
market in terms of product price and functionality, stressing reusability and
economies of scope in designs, methods, tools, and application-specific
knowledge, and appealing to customers that seemed sensitive to a combination
of price and product performance.
On the other hand, firms in both the high-end, "full custom" business and
those making standardized packages appeared to require somewhat loosely-
structured, project-centered approaches that were different with each product
and relied heavily on personnel who were highly skilled and knowledgeable
about particular applications. Unique projects and highly-skilled personnel were
probably more expensive to manage, although this probably does not matter to
the producer if customers of premium products or services pay adequately high
prices or if a package becomes a "best seller" and reaps large revenues, since
there should be minimal incremental expenses in software (excluding efforts
needed for distribution and marketing), since replication of a program is a
simple, nearly instantaneous electronic process.
Factory-like software facilities thus combined some of the flexibility of job
shops, in that they made unique or customized software, with some of the
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efficiency of factory modes of production. This positioning very much
resembled the category of the "analyzer," posed by Miles and Snow. These
firms adopted follower strategies in the market place, often allowing small,
entrepreneurial firms ("prospectors") to lead in inventions. The analyzers then
analyze these products and, through a more structured organization or process,
try to introduce similar or superior products at lower prices. Yet, in
combination with more controls and emphases on efficiency than the innovating
firms, analyzers had to be flexible enough to respond quickly to the arrival of
new products and markets. They also stood in contrast to "defenders," who
attempt to hold high-priced niches or defend mass-market positions through cost
reduction, and "reactors," who seem to follow no one particular strategy but
mainly respond to the actions of others (Miles and Snow, 1978; Miles et al.,
1978).
The electronic nature of production operations in software facilities brings
up another distinctive characteristic of software factories that is not the focus
of this study but which has become a major area of research in itself:
Software factories represented a new type of production organization, where the
"workers" were different from employees in conventional manufacturing. Not
only was there was no conventional mass production; but even coding jobs were
relatively skilled and technical, while most "work" consisted of design, testing,
and redesign on computer screens, as well as meetings to coordinate divided and
cooperative tasks, and filling in reports or writing documentation (Hirshhorn,
1984; Zuboff, 1986; Orlikowski, 1988).
It follows that managerial tasks in factory-like software facilities were
also different. Conventional decision-making algorithms relying on economies of
scale and learning curves to determine precisely the time and cost of different
tasks did not readily apply. In fact, some writers even lamented the appearance
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of "dis-economies of scale": average productivity levels decreasing as the
number of members in a project, or the size of a program, rose beyond a
certain manageable level (Brooks, 1975; Boehm, 1981; Banker and Kemerer, 1988).
The reality of software development was that managers faced a complex,
iterative series of design, product-construction, testing, and redesign operations,
for products that were unique or customized and thus likely to encounter some
unpredictable or new requirements. What software factories achieved was to
place some boundaries on this unpredictability, in both products and processes.
CONCLUSION
It seems clear that software producers, like firms in other industries, do
not all fit neatly into any one categorization. They were not conventional
production organizations, which provided the impetus for categories such as job
shop and factory. Still, firms seemed to fall into a spectrum -- in terms of
manager emphases, prices, and customer responses to their products and
services.
A related conclusion follows: The quest for an absolute answer to whether
software development is or should be managed more like an art or craft rather
than science or engineering is probably fruitless. This is because the nature of
software development, and the optimal process or organization, depend on the
specific tasks at hand. To the extent that these tasks differ with market
segments, product types, and a firm's competitive positioning, whether software
is appropriate for a factory-like process is a strategic choice subject to
management discretion. In other words, management choices, in response to the
characteristics of software products and customers, the technology, and perhaps
features specific to programmers and programming organizations, can result in a
range of process and structural variations in software organizations. The most
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relevant concern for managers should thus be not how to label software
development but how to create an effective balance: of efficiency, such as
standards and tools; and flexibility -- the ability to adapt to different customer
needs as well as change and evolve, through the use of effective but versatile
procedures, methods, tools, controls, and components, as well as individual or
organizational skills.
This study thus supports both strategic and contingency perspectives:
Factory-like approaches to software development, though important for what
they reveal about organizations and technology management, seem appropriate
only for some product or market segments and some competitive strategies. Be
that as it may, another thought emerging from this research may find little
support among those who would insist software development forever remain an
art or craft: Where more structured approaches appear possible and
advantageous to introduce, adhocratic or job-shop practices represent a waste
of human and capital resources, and an opportunity for management to improve
the competitive capabilities of the firm.
There seem, in fact, many advantages to pursuing a more structured
process, if at all possible. Job- or craft-oriented approaches make it difficult
for software developers to share experiences in problem solving and apply
potentially useful solutions arrived at in one project -- such as tools, methods,
procedures, and product designs -- to other projects. One might even argue
that both the difficulty or inappropriateness of product and process
standardization across different projects, as well as insufficient efforts toward
this end, contribute to the recurrence of similar problems year after year.
Solving the same problems over and over again wastes valuable human effort,
taking away time that skilled personnel might spend in improving products or
inventing new ones or new processes. The task facing software producers -- as
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many of their counterparts in other industries have already realized -- is not
only to remain adaptable to change but to identify areas of repetition or
recurring problems and then create a strategy and infrastructure -- of tools,
methods, reusable designs, and people -- that might turn this more systematic
management of product and process development into a competitive variable.
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Table 1: SOFTWARE-FACTORY CASE STUDIES
= Operating Systems, Database Management Systems, Language
Utilities, and Related Basic Software
= General Business Applications
= Industrial Real-Time Control Applications
= Telecommunications Software (Switching, Transmission)
Notes: All facilities develop software for mainframes or minicomputers.






















































Table 2: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND TECHNOLOGY
Structure Technology Tasks Problems Characteristics
Machine Routine, Few exceptions, Standardized and de-skilled
Bureaucracy Mass well-defined work, centralization, divisions
Production of labor, high formalization
of rules and procedures
Professional Engineering Many exceptions, Standardized and specialized
Bureaucracy well-defined skills, decentralization, low
formalization
Adhocracy Non-routine Many exceptions, Specialized skills but few or
ill-defined no organization standards,
decentralization, low
formalization
Simple Unit or Few exceptions, Few standardized specialized
Structure Craft ill-defined skills, centralized authority
but low formalization
Sources: Woodward, 1965; Mintzberg, 1979; Perrow, 1967 and 1972; Robbins, 1987.
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Table 3: SURVEY AND SAMPLE OUTLINE
SAMPLE: N = 51 (25 Japanese, 26 U.S., 1 Canadian)
SURVEY PARTICIPANTS: Software Development Managers
ANSWERS KEY:
4 = Capability or policy is FULLY USED OR ENFORCED
3 = Capability or policy is FREQUENTLY USED OR ENFORCED
2 = Capability or policy is SOMETIMES USED OR ENFORCED
1 = Capability or policy is SELDOM USED OR ENFORCED
0 = Capability or policy is NOT USED
SURVEY OUESTIONS:
Dimension I: InPuts Standardization (Max. Score = 12)
1. Formal management promotion (beyond the discretion of individual project
managers) that new code be written in modular form with the intention
that modules (in addition to common subroutines) will then serve as
reusable "units of production" in future projects
2. Formal management promotion (beyond the discretion of individual project
managers) that, if a module designed to perform a specific function (in
addition to common subroutines) is in the program library system, rather
than duplicating such a module, it should be reused.
3. Monitoring of how much code is being reused
Dimension II: Tool and Process Standardization and Control (Max. Score = 20)
4. Project data bases standardized for all groups working on the same
product components, to support consistency in building of program
modules, configuration management, documentation, maintenance, and
potential reusability of code.
5. A system interface providing the capability to link support tools, project
data bases, the centralized production data base and program libraries.
6. A centralized program library system to store modules and documentation.
7. A central production or development data base connecting programming
groups working on a single product family to track information on
milestones, task completion, resources, and system components, to facilitate
overall project control and to serve as a data source for statistics on
programmer productivity, costs, scheduling accuracy, etc.
8. A uniform set of specification, design, coding, testing, and documentation
procedures used among project groups within a centralized facility or
across different sites working on the same product family to facilitate
standardization of practices and/or division of labor for programming tasks
and related activities.
Total for 8 Variables (Max. Score of 32 = 100%)
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Table 4: SUMMARY AND RANKING OF SURVEY SCORES (%)
SAMPLE: N = 51 (25 Japanese, 25 U.S., 1 Canadian)
Notes: * Indicates Japanese facilities
@ Indicates averaged responses
Max. Score = 12 20
COMPANY/FACILITY Inputs Tools/Process
Telecommunications Software
*NT&T Applications@ 11 16
*Mitsubishi Electric 9 17
*Fujitsu Communications 9 15
*NEC Switching Systems 9 14
AT&T Bell Labs Applications) 7 16
Bell Communications Research 6 15
*Hitachi Totsuka Works 6 13
*NT&T Systems@ 6 12
Bell North Research 5 20
Commercial Operating Systems
Digital VAX (Layered Products) 11 16
*NEC Software, Ltd. 10 18
*NEC Fuchu Factory 9 18
IBM-Endicott 8 17
*Hitachi Software Works@ 8 15
Control Data@ 7 17.5
Digital VMS 7 16
*Fujitsu Numazu Factory@ 7 16
*Mitsubishi Electric 7 12
Unisys/Sperry@ 5.5 12
Data General 5 13.5
IBM-Raleigh 2 17
Real-Time Control Alications
*Toshiba Software Factory 12 16
*NEC Industrial Systems 12 16
Unisys/SDC 11 14
*Hitachi Omika Works 10 15
TRW 9 20
Unisys/Sperry@ 8 20
*Mitsubishi Electric 8 15
Hughes Aircraft 5.5 17
Boeing@ 3 16
Honeywell 2 10
Draper Laboratories@ 1 6.5
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Table 4 continued
Max. Score = 12 20
COMPANY/FACILITY Inputs Tools/Process
Industrial Operating Systems
*Toshiba Software Factory ' 12 16
Boeing@ 3 15
Business Applications
*Nippon Systemware 11 14
*Nippon Business Consultants 10 11
*Fujitsu Kamata Software Factory@ 9.5 15
Martin Marietta/MD 9.5 13
*NEC Information Services 9 19
Control Data@ 9 18
*Hitachi Omori Works 8 15
*NEC Mita 8 15
*Hitachi Software Engineering@ 7.5 9
IBM (Office Products) 7 16
Arthur Anderson 7 20
EDS/GM@ 6 12.5
Cullinet 6 13
*Nippon Electronics Development 6 7
*Mitsubishi Electric 4 10
Martin Marietta/Denver 3 14
Computervision@ 3 6
Digital (Educational Products) 3 5
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Table 5: COMPARISON OF AVERAGE JAPANESE AND N.A. SURVEY SCORES
Note: Standard Deviations are in parentheses
n = 25 n = 27 N = 52
Dimension Japanese N A. Sample Average
8.7 (2.1)* 5.9 (2.7) 7.3 (2.4)
Tools/Process 14.4 (2.9) 15.0 (3.7) 14.7 (3.3)
* p < 0.01
Table 6: EFFECTS OF COUNTRY AND PRODUCT TYPE
Test: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
N = 52 (25 Japanese, 26 U.S., 1 Canadian)










Effects on TOOLS/PROCESS Score:
Variable F-ratio Sig. Level
Country# .066 .8013
Product Type## 1.395 .2522
1
4
# Coded as 0 = Japanese facility, 1 = North American facility
## Coded as 1 = Telecommunications Software, 2 = Commercial Operating
Systems, 3 = Industrial Operating Systems, 4 = Real-Time Control
Applications, 5 = General Applications
Table 7: COMPARISON OF REPORTED JAPANESE AND N.A. REUSE RATES
n = 18 n =18 N = 36
Japanese (Std. D.) N.A. Std. D) Sample Averaae




Table 8: EFFECTS OF COUNTRY AND PRODUCT TYPE ON REUSE RATES













# Coded as 0 = Japanese facility, 1 = N.A. facility
## Coded as 1 = Telecommunications Software, 2 = Commercial Operating
Systems, 3 = Industrial Operating Systems, 4 = Real-Time Control
Applications, 5 = General Applications
Table 9: REUSE EMPHASIS AND REPORTED REUSE RATES
Test: MULTIPLE REGRESSION






























Table 10: JAPAN-U.S. HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE COMPARISON, 1987
Notes: Japanese Yen converted at $1.00 = 125 Yen
NA = Not Available
Custom Software/System Integration for Japan includes consulting ($.67
billion); for the U.S. market, this category refers to contract
programming and design
Japan U.S.
Total Market $34.1 $70.4
Software Revenues/Total Market 38% 35%
Hardware Shipments $21.0 100% $45.6 100%
Large Systems 8.7 41 9.1 20
Medium Systems 3.1 15 8.7 19
Small Systems 5.0 24 8.2 18
Personal Computers 4.2 20 19.6 43
Software-Vendor Revenues $13.0 100% $24.8 100%
Total Packages 1.4 11 13.1 53
Types:
(Systems/Utilities) NA -- (5.0) (20)
(Application Tools) N.4 -- (3.7) (15)
(Application Packages) NA -- (4.5) (18)
Custom Software/System Integration 10.1 78 9.6 39
(Custom Software Only) (7.9) (61) NA --
Facilities Management/Maintenance 1.4 11 2.1 8
Miscellaneous Data:
1987-1992 Compound Annual Growth 17% 20%
Estimate for Software Revenues
Annual Growth in Supply 13% 4%
of Programmers
Typical Wait for Customized 26 40
Programs in Months (ca. 1984)
Computer Makers as Suppliers:
of Basic Systems Software 70% 45%
of Applications Software 15% 5%
Sou rces: International Data Corporation, "Japan Computer Industry: Review
and Forecast, 1987-1992," January 1989; and International Data
Corporation, Computer Industry ReDort: The Gray Sheet, 16
December 1988, p. 3. Also, for miscellaneous data, U.S. Department
of Commerce, A Competitive Assessment of the U.S. Software
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Industry; A. Zavala, "Research on Factors that Influence the
Productivity of Software Development Workers," Palo Alto, Calif.,
SRI International, June 1985; H. Aiso, "Overview of Japanese
National Projects in Information Technology," International
Symposium on Computer Architecture, Lecture 1, June 1986, Tokyo;
Fumihiko Kamijo, "Information Technology Activities in the
Japanese Software Industry," Oxford Surveys in Information
Technology, Vol. 3, 1986.
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Figure 1: EMPHASIS ON REUSE VERSUS TOOL AND PROCESS STANDARDIZATION
N - 51 (25 JAPAN, 25 U.S., 1 CANADA)
CODES: 0 - JAPANESE FACILITIES
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Figure 2: SPECTRUM OF PRODUCTION APPROACHES
CRAFT PRODUCTION OR JOB-SHOP
Stratecgy: Customize Products and Processes for Individual Customers
Implementation:
Tradeoff:
Little Strategic Integration Beyond the Individual Project
Nearly Unlimited Range of Products and Customers
Few Economies of Scale or Scope
Focus on Product and Process Flexibility
Little Process and Quality Standardization or Control
Project-Centered Process R&D
Dependence on Highly Skilled, Multi-Functional Workers
Little Functional Divisions of Labor
No Systematic Reuse of Product Components
Little Capital-intensive Automation
Product-Process Flexibility Over Process Efficiency
FLEXIBLE DESIGN AND PRODUCTION
Strateya: Efficient Production of Different Products
Implementation:
Tradeoff:
More Strategic Integration and Management
Broad But More Limited Range of Products and Customers
Planned Economies of Scope More Than of Scale
Focus on Process Analysis and Improvement
More Process and Quality Standardization and Control
Tailored and Centralized Process R&D
Standardization of Worker Skills
Some Functional Divisions of Labor
Some Systematic Reuse of Product Components
Extensive Use of Computer-Aided Tools
Effort and Risks Required to Balance Efficiency and
Flexibility
MASS-PRODUCTION ENGINEERING AND MANUFACTURING
Strategy: Mass Production of Standardized Products
Implementation:
Tradeoff:
High Level of Strategic Integration and Management
Narrow Range of Products and Customers
High Economies of Scale
Focus on Process Standardization and Efficiency
High Process and Quality Standardization and Control
Tailored and Centralized Process R&D
Highly Standardized Worker Tasks and Skills
Rigid Functional Divisions of Labor
Reuse of Interchangeable Product Components
Rigid Automation
Process Efficiency Over Product-Process Flexibility
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1. A forthcoming book based on these case studies and other material on the
technology and management responses is Michael A. Cusumano, The Software
Factory: Japan's New Challenge in Technology and Management, New York and
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990.
2. This list excludes a group of 200 people that did not produce software for
sale but made up the System Development department of Hallmark Cards, Inc.,
which produced programs for in-house use but is referred to by a former
manager as a "Software Factory" (Johnson, 1989).
3. Additional questions were also sent to survey participants, although
comments from the responders, site visits and interviews, as well as partial
correlation analysis, revealed that many of the non-core questions were not
particularly useful for measuring "rationalization" along large-scale engineering
and manufacturing lines. For example, three questions asked for emphasis on
standardization of languages for high-level design, module description, and
coding. It turned out that Japanese and English were mainly used for high-
level design, and many managers did not know how to answer; Japanese tended
to develop specialized languages for module description because they were less
comfortable than U.S. programmers in using English-based languages for this
purpose, which made it unfair to U.S. firms to use this question; and coding
languages were often determined by customers. A question about top-down
design was discarded because emphasis on this tended to contrast with a more
factory-type process of combining new and old code in layers. Similarly,
questions about emphasis on high-level abstraction or layering were discarded
because not everyone knew how to interpret these.
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4. In the case of Toshiba, a single large facility (approximately 2300
programmers) had different departments producing both systems and applications
programs using identical procedures and tools, and the manager responsible for
technical development, Dr. Yoshihiro Matsumoto, submitted one set of answers
and asked that they be counted twice, under both systems and applications facilities.
5. This procedure is recommended as a simple data reduction technique by
Comrey, 1973, and Tabachnick and Fidell, 1983. Comrey suggested that loadings
of .55 (explaining 30% of the variance) were "very good," and .63 (40% variance)
or over "excellent."
6. Interviews with Anne Smith Duncan, Software Engineering Manager, Software
Development Technology, Digital Equipment Corporation, 2/10/88; and Wendy
McKay, Project Manager, Educational Software, Digital Equipment Corporation,
12/88.
7. Interviews with Matsumoto Yoshiharu, R&D Department Manager; Matsuzaki
Yoshizo, Applications Software Department Manager; and Takahashi Tomoo,
Applications Software Department Deputy Manager, Hitachi Software
Engineering, 9/3/87.
8. The top three Japanese firms ranked by software sales in 1986 were NEC
($507 million), Fujitsu ($389 million), and Hitachi ($331 million). NEC ranked
fourth in the world, behind IBM ($5,514 million), Unisys ($861), and DEC ($560).
The Japanese sales figures considerably understate actual software development,
because Japanese firms included ("bundled") systems software with mainframe
and minicomputer hardware prices, although the size of systems software
operations corresponds roughly to hardware sales. The largest Japanese
producers of mainframes by 1986 sales were Fujitsu ($2,470 million), NEC
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($2,275), Hitachi ($1,371), and Mitsubishi ($185); the largest sellers of
minicomputers were Toshiba ($766), Fujitsu ($620), and Mitsubishi ($475). On
the U.S. side, IBM was by far the world's largest producer of hardware and
software; three of its facilities are represented in the survey. Unisys, which
ranked 2nd in world software sales, has two facilities in the survey. In
services, TRW ranked 1st and General Motors/EDS 3rd; Control Data, Martin
Marietta, and NT&T 6th, 7th, and 8th; Boeing and IBM 12th and 13th. See
DATAMATION, 15 June 1987, pp. 28-32. Other large Japanese producers of
software included in this survey were subsidiaries of Hitachi and NEC, including
Nippon Business Consultants and Hitachi Software Engineering (Hitachi), as well
as NEC Software, NEC Information Systems, and Nippon Electronics Development
(NEC).
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